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Abstract
General practitioners have implicitly been given responsibility for guiding men’s decisions 
about prostate-specific antigen–based screening for prostate cancer, but patients’ 
expectations of the bounds of this responsibility remain unclear. We sought to explore 
how well-informed members of the public allocate responsibilities in prostate-specific 
antigen screening decision-making. In 2014, we convened two Community juries in 
Sydney, Australia, to address questions related to the content and timing of information 
provision and respective roles of patients and general practitioners in screening 
decisions. Participants in the first jury were of mixed gender and of all ages (n = 15); the 
participants in the second jury were all male and of screening age (n = 12). Both juries 
were presented with balanced factual evidence on the harms and benefits of prostate-
specific antigen screening and expert perspectives on ethico-legal aspects of consent in 
medical practice. In their deliberations, jurors agreed that general practitioners should 
take responsibility for informing men of the options, risks and benefits of prostate-
specific antigen testing, but arrived at different positions on whether or not general 
practitioners should also guide screening decisions. Jurors also disagreed on how much 
and when general practitioners should provide detailed information about biopsies 
and treatments. These responses suggest that for prostate-specific antigen testing, 
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there is a public expectation that both the allocation of responsibility between general 
practitioners and their male patients, and the level of information provided will be 
tailored to individual men. In the presence of expert uncertainty, a well-informed public 
may have reason to embrace or resist shared decision-making processes.
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Introduction
The goal of using the prostate-specific antigen (PSA) test as a screening tool is to detect 
individuals with early-stage cancer so as to offer early and more effective treatment and 
thus reduce the suffering and death caused by this disease (Moyer, 2012). Yet, the poten-
tial for PSA testing in asymptomatic men to promote over-diagnosis and over-treatment 
causes concern among experts and ongoing controversy. The vast majority of prostate 
cancers detected through screening are indolent and never cause harm – only a small 
percentage eventually cause symptoms or death (Chou et al., 2011; Ilic et al., 2011). The 
PSA test is not highly specific (it will often produce a high reading in the absence of 
cancer), and current diagnostic procedures have limited capacity to distinguish life-
threatening prostate cancers from the indolent ones. Because of this, there are strongly 
opposing views about the value of the PSA test for screening asymptomatic men (Wilt 
et al., 2014).
Professional bodies in the United States, United Kingdom and Australia vary in their 
recommendations for PSA testing of asymptomatic men for prostate cancer (Pickles 
et al., 2015). Most clinical guidelines seek to address the uncertainty about the value of 
PSA testing by recommending that men are fully informed of the potential advantages 
and disadvantages of PSA screening prior to testing. The US Preventive Services Task 
Force (USPSTF) and the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners (RACGP) 
recommendations focus on providing information only to men who initiate the conversa-
tion about screening (Knight, 2014). The rationale for advising clinicians to not raise the 
issue themselves if men haven’t asked about the PSA test are uncertainty about the ben-
efits of PSA screening and concerns that men may interpret GPs raising the topic as a 
recommendation or endorsement. Yet while many experts have deep reservations about 
PSA screening, research consistently shows that many men do want to be screened or are 
encouraged to do so by their families (Howard et al., 2013; Squiers et al., 2013). A lot of 
older men are anxious about the risks of prostate cancer, and many believe it is irrespon-
sible not to be screened (Schwartz et al., 2004).
General practitioners (GPs) are increasingly expected to share decision-making about 
PSA testing with asymptomatic men. Empirical studies indicate, however, that in prac-
tice sharing decisions can be difficult (Mendick et al., 2010; Sinding et al., 2010). Expert 
assumptions about patients’ roles and responsibilities often fail to meet patient’s expecta-
tions or reflect their experiences (Robertson et al., 2011; Saba et al., 2006). In 2014, we 
conducted two community juries to explore what different groups of well-informed 
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members of the public thought should happen before men decided whether or not to have 
a PSA test to screen for prostate cancer. We sought information on public expectations of 
patient and clinician roles and responsibilities, and the moral obligations of GPs, with 
respect to PSA testing (Degeling et al., 2015b). In this article, we provide a normatively 
informed qualitative analysis of the jurors’ deliberations and outline why attributing 
responsibility in PSA screening decisions remains a contentious issue.
Background
Cancer is an emotionally charged issue. Decisions about whether or not to take part in 
PSA screening for prostate cancer are difficult because of the risks of negative conse-
quences from both testing and non-testing. Because PSA testing almost always takes 
place in primary-care settings (Vedel et al., 2011), GPs have implicitly been given the 
responsibility for guiding men’s decisions about whether or not they should have a PSA 
test to screen for prostate cancer. In Australia – where there is no organised programme 
of PSA screening but opportunistic testing in clinical settings is common (Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), 2013) – these interactions are typically con-
strued through a doctor–patient relationship. Recent research in Australia indicates that 
men receive different care depending on how their GP understands and seeks to dis-
charge his or her responsibilities for PSA testing (Pickles et al., 2015).
Research consistently shows that while many patients prefer to share healthcare deci-
sions with their treating doctor (Benbassat et al., 1998), individuals also vary in how 
much they wish to concern themselves with the relevant evidence (Deber et al., 2007; 
Doherty et al., 2015). Negotiating these differences, while seeking to explain the com-
plexity of PSA screening, creates complications for effective communication and deci-
sion-making (Clements et al., 2007; Linder et al., 2014). Studies of prostate cancer 
screening in primary-care settings have mainly focused on factors that influence GP and 
patient attitudes towards and decisions about PSA testing (Archer and Hayter, 2006; 
Finney Rutten et al., 2005; Pollack et al., 2012; Purvis Cooper et al., 2004). This body of 
research provides key insights into variations in how GPs and patients reason and com-
municate about PSA testing, but does little to illuminate their perspectives on the norma-
tive dimensions of these clinical encounters. Heterogeneity in GP practices and ambiguity 
about GP roles, and who is responsible for decisions on whether or not to screen for 
prostate cancer, are all key issues in the broader PSA debate (Han et al., 2013; Wheeler 
et al., 2011). Yet what such responsibility entails and how attributions of responsibility 
can be justified are rarely explicated (Munthe et al., 2012).
Making sense of responsibility in decision-making
Almost 40 years ago, the legal and political philosopher HLA Hart (1968) identified that 
normative claims about responsibility often fail to have substantial impacts upon the 
world because the term can be construed to have different meanings and ethical valences 
in ordinary language use. Claims about responsibility rest on assumptions that an agent’s 
choices and actions are necessary links in the causal chain that produce a specific out-
come. However, the traits or characteristics of the agent are also important. For an agent 
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to be responsible is generally thought to depend on them meeting a set of capacity crite-
ria such as prior knowledge, rationality, and the possibility that the agent could do other-
wise. Notably, most accounts of autonomy depend on similar criteria; the concepts are 
intertwined such that basic autonomy and normative competence are often held to be the 
minimal condition for being responsible (Christman, 2015). While modern concepts of 
responsibility seem to rest on a notion of agency – a special type of control that only 
those held accountable can exercise – whether it even makes sense to ascribe responsibil-
ity to agents in a (at least partly) deterministic world is the subject of ongoing philosophi-
cal debate (Fischer and Ravizza, 2000; Strawson, 1994). The net effect is that despite the 
frequency and normative force of attributions of responsibility, the implicitness of 
assumptions and the ambiguity of concepts-in-use have limited our understanding of 
responsibility in discussions about clinical decision-making.
There are a number of different typologies of responsibility, each of which attempts 
to capture the way in which we can meaningfully ascribe praise or blame to agents 
(Fischer and Ravizza, 2000; Hart, 1968). The philosopher Nicole Vincent (2011) has 
attempted to capture, disambiguate and codify the nature and meaning of different 
responsibility concepts in a structured taxonomy. Both drawing on and synthesising key 
contributions to philosophical discussions, she identifies six interrelated but subtly dif-
ferent concepts that are commonly described as ‘responsibility’ in ordinary language use. 
They are as follows:
Virtue-responsibility. To call somebody ‘responsible’ in this sense is to say something 
good about their character, reputation or intentions, as exemplified by their previous 
conduct and commitment to doing what they take to be right. The opposite of this 
description is to be irresponsible, which is to lack this virtue
Role-responsibility. It refers to the duties attached to a person in virtue of their insti-
tutional, social or moral position. In this context, the term is forward-looking and 
prescriptive – it describes what a person ought and ought not do, and any expectations 
held for which their failure to act will rightfully attract moral criticism.
Outcome-responsibility. It refers to outcomes for which a person is held responsible. 
In this context, the term is descriptive and backward-looking and can apply events 
and states of affairs attributable to something people or institutions have done (or 
failed to do). Notably, this use of the term closely resembles most philosophers’ con-
ception of moral responsibility.
Causal-responsibility. It is similar to outcome-responsibility, but carries less norma-
tive weight. It refers to causal links between events and states of affairs such that the 
term is being used as a synonym for a ‘cause’ or ‘condition’. In this context, the con-
cept of ‘responsibility’ is being used to highlight that person’s actions have signifi-
cance to producing a specific outcome, without being completely morally responsible 
in the sense described above by ‘outcome-responsibility’.
Capacity-responsibility. It refers to the threshold above which agents can be held 
responsible because they have capacity to make realistic and voluntary choices based on 
rational and informed thought. In this typology, capacities, which are largely cognitive, 
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are held to be distinct from morally-relevant character traits. This allows for the disam-
biguation of and meaningful contrast between capacity- and virtue-responsibility.
Liability-responsibility. It refers to who will be held responsible for outcomes and the 
sanctions and moral burdens that will apply to the responsible agent. Judgements 
about liability require prior judgements of outcome- and virtue-responsibility. Vincent 
(2011: 18) notes that when ‘responsibility’ is used in this way, ‘it is usually coupled 
with another word – i.e. take responsibility or hold responsible – and it refers to the 
things that someone must do, or how they should be treated, to set things right’.
Arguably, Vincent’s (2011) main contribution is that her taxonomy brings each of the 
responsibility concepts into a structured relationship. It allows us to begin to understand how 
attributions of one type of responsibility can influence and potentially justify attributions of 
the others. To help explain the nature of these interactions, we have adapted Vincent’s origi-
nal diagram by adding a description of relationships between the different concepts (Figure 
1). When supported by specific goals and well-defined sets of social norms or standards, 
each of these responsibility concepts can also be brought to bear in evaluating interactions 
between agents (people and institutions). The social norms and goals that sit in the back-
ground of attributions of praise or blame for outcomes and actions are important because 
they determine the role-responsibilities and types and level of capacity that are reasonably 
held to impose duties on agents. Taken together and contextualised in this manner, the six 
concepts and the relationships between them seek to capture key aspects of the socio-ethical 
and epistemological environments in which judgements about responsibility are made.
For example, as Figure 1 illustrates, claims that an agent is responsible for an outcome 
depend on prior claims about their causal- and role-responsibilities, and conclusions about 
both of these hinge on judgements about the agent’s capacity. Judgements about capacity are 
typically subject to a threshold – agents either do or do not have sufficient capacity to be 
Figure 1. Adapted from Vincent’s (2011: 20) structured taxonomy of responsibility concepts.
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held responsible for their specific role, causal influence or both, in producing an outcome. 
Judgements about capacity also indicate what kinds of roles are appropriate for agents to 
take or highlight when attributions of outcome-responsibility are inappropriate. Therefore, 
to be held responsible for an outcome, an agent must, at a minimum, have capacity, have a 
causal role and violate their role-responsibilities without a valid reason for doing so.
Vincent’s structured taxonomy has the potential to bring clarity to discussions and 
debates where ‘who’ is rightfully to be held responsible for ‘what’ remains a point of conten-
tion. The norms surrounding PSA testing and the role-responsibilities of experts and asymp-
tomatic men in screening decision-making are still very much in flux. Recommendations 
about its use are increasingly predicated on ensuring effective communication and informed- 
or shared-decision-making (IDM/SDM). Numerous models of IDM/SDM making for PSA 
screening have been put forward (Volk et al., 2007). However, recent reports indicate it is 
not routinely used in practice or inconsistently applied (Couët et al., 2013; Han et al., 2013). 
More generally, there is a lack of clarity as to how healthcare providers and patients can 
meaningfully take part in IDM/SDM (Doherty et al., 2015; Sandman and Munthe, 2010), 
and neither the core competencies for GPs nor the appropriate triggers for IDM/SDM during 
consultations have been formalised (Ferrer and Gill, 2013). Because expectations of respon-
sibility in IDM/SDM are under-conceptualised, we sought information on how informed 
publics allocate roles and responsibility for PSA screening decisions.
Methods
A community jury is a process in which a broadly representative group of citizens or 
service users are brought together to be educated about and deliberate on a specific issue 
(Degeling et al., 2015a). What distinguishes such deliberative methods from other 
research methodologies for eliciting public views is the creation of a structured and con-
structive process of information exchange and knowledge-making between experts and 
members of the public. In this study, we convened two community juries to hear testi-
mony from and ask questions of expert witnesses who provided a range of views on the 
value and risks of the PSA test and Australian ethical–legal requirements for informed 
consent. We then invited jurors to deliberate and vote on two related questions:
Question A: Select 1 or 2
1. Should GPs introduce the topic of PSA testing during appointments with male 
patients who have no symptoms?
 OR
2. Should they wait until men ask about it?
Question B: Which of these options do you endorse? (Please give your reasons)
1. Men without symptoms should get all the information about the possible benefits 
and harms of testing, and biopsy and treatment, before they decide whether or 
not to have a PSA test.
 OR
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2. Men should not get information about possible benefits and harms of biopsy and 
treatment before PSA testing. Instead, the doctor should wait until they know the 
test result. If the test result is raised, then the doctor should give information.
Recruitment
A total of 27 participants of diverse background with no experience of prostate cancer 
were recruited via social and news media: one jury with mixed genders and ages and 
one all-male jury of screening age. While we sought to include participants from diverse 
educational, social and cultural backgrounds, final group composition was also deter-
mined by volunteer availability (Table 1). The first jury (n = 15, 9 males and 6 females) 
was socio-culturally diverse and included participants with above average level of edu-
cational attainment; the final all-male jury (n = 12) was more socially and culturally 
diverse and broadly representative of the average level of educational attainment in the 
Table 1. Characteristics of jury participants.
Jury 1 (n = 15) Jury 2 (n = 12)
Age (years)
 <40 5 1
 40–70 8 9
 >70 2 2
 Range 19–75 37–74
 Median 49 57
Gender
 Male 9 12
 Female 6 0
Highest educational attainment
 High school 3 1
 Trade/diploma 1 7
 Bachelor degree 7 3
 Postgraduate degree 4 1
Cultural background/ethnicitya
 Australian 11 7
 Southern/Eastern European 1 0
 South-East Asian 0 1
 North-East Asian 2 2
 Southern/Central Asian 1 1
 North-West European 0 1
Socio-economic status of suburbb
 Low 1 2
 Middle 4 4
 High 10 6
aBased on Australian Standard Classification of Cultural and Ethnic Groups (ASCEG).
bBased on Socio-Economic Index for Area (SEIFA).
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Australian population. Our study was approved by the Cancer Institute of NSW: 
HREC/12/CIPHS/46.
Each jury was held over a weekend and commenced with an orientation session on the 
Friday evening where participants were introduced to the questions to be deliberated, and 
consent to participate was obtained. Day 1 of the jury focused on hearing expert wit-
nesses, interrogating the evidence on the PSA test and understanding the ethico-legal and 
practical issues that surround informed consent in medical practice. Expert witness ses-
sions ran for approximately an hour with the experts available following the presentation 
so that jurors could ask them questions or clarify the arguments presented. Interrogation 
of each witness typically lasted for 30 minutes. On the second day, for the first hour the 
jurors reflected on, discussed and debated with the aid of a facilitator the evidence pre-
sented to them. The juries then deliberated for an hour without a facilitator present to 
come to a verdict on the questions posed, which was then reported to the research team 
in a final facilitated feedback session.
Data collection and extraction
In the final session of both juries, their findings were recorded and compiled onto a flip-
chart by a facilitator. Each point was then reviewed by the jury to ensure the recorded 
verdict was an accurate summary of their deliberations and conclusions. All jury delib-
erations (both facilitated and un-facilitated) and question and answer sessions were 
audio-recorded and transcribed in detail by a professional transcriber.
Our approach to data extraction and analysis was broadly consistent with the tenets of 
Framework methodologies (Gale et al., 2013). Transcripts of the jury sessions were read 
several times by the lead author. Open coding was used to identify the range of normative 
arguments, meanings and reasoning put forward by the jurors in their deliberations. Authors 
1 and 2 then reviewed the annotated transcripts, and the logic and rationale of their findings 
were discussed by all three authors. Responsibility was identified as a central normative 
concept in jurors’ reasoning, and the lead author sought useful conceptual models of 
responsibility from the literature. Vincent’s (2011) structured taxonomy of responsibility 
concepts was identified, and all authors agreed it provided a useful Analytic Framework as 
it allowed greater analytic purchase on the concept of responsibility in the data. Transcripts 
were then analysed in further detail by the first author using Vincent’s taxonomy as a 
framework. Talks that employed normative concepts such as ‘responsibility’, ‘role’, ‘obli-
gation’, ‘to owe’ and ‘duty’ were captured and manually tabulated. Our analysis then pro-
ceeded through cycles of repeated readings, constant comparisons, discussions among all 
the authors, periods of testing of alternate explanations and then re-immersion within the 
research materials (Borkan, 1999). During our initial readings, we also noted that jurors 
also spoke of their own and others’ ‘rights’, and by this they were referring to the reciprocal 
obligations arising from the institutional role occupied by GPs and the special relationship 
GPs have with their patients. Because contractual models of ‘rights’ entail specific respon-
sibilities, we included interactions where jurors discussed ‘rights’ in our final analyses.
Drawing on Vincent’s taxonomy, our analytic strategy paid attention to the ways in 
which jurors reasoned through and made claims about the respective roles and responsi-
bilities of GPs and patients in communication and decision-making for PSA screening. 
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As analysts, we understood that jury deliberations are essentially discussions within 
groups of strangers. We did not approach analysis assuming we could access the true 
opinions or beliefs of the participants, but recognised that the essence of deliberation is 
reasoning with others such that an individual’s opinions can change through the course 
of a discussion or debate. We were interested in the positions participants took during 
deliberations and the underlying reasons and rationales presented by participants for why 
a position was seen to be important and justified.
Results
The verdict – GPs should raise the topic of PSA testing with their patients
After 2 days of considering the evidence, asking questions and deliberating, the commu-
nity juries voted in the following manner. For the first question (Question A), there was 
a strong majority verdict in favour of the proposition that GPs should introduce the topic 
of PSA testing with asymptomatic men aged 50–70 in both the mixed-gender (12 votes 
to 3) and all-male (10 votes to 2) juries. The rationale was that primary healthcare pro-
viders are in the best position to introduce the topic, and all men should have equal 
access to the same information. Jurors said GPs were a reliable point of information 
access. Relying on other sources would be ‘leaving it to chance’, meaning that some men 
would not know about PSA-based screening and not have the opportunity to decide for 
themselves. Because neither jury reached consensus, a minority of participants in both 
juries voted for the proposition that GPs should not introduce the topic to their asympto-
matic male patients. The rationale for this minority position was that men are better off 
not knowing about a medical intervention about which there is such uncertainty and the 
risks potentially outweigh the benefits.
For the second question (Question B), the first mixed-gender jury voted 13 to 2 that 
GPs should inform men of the potential harms and benefits of PSA-based screening 
before they took the test (option 1). Notably, the second jury comprising men of screen-
ing age voted very differently to the first jury on this question, with a two-thirds majority 
(8 votes to 4) forming around the proposition that men should not get information about 
possible benefits and harms of biopsy and treatment before PSA testing. The majority of 
this all-male jury concluded GPs should wait until their patients receive a raised PSA test 
result before giving them information about further steps and possibilities (option 2). The 
rationales provided by the second jury for not informing men about the potential benefits 
and harms of PSA-based screening before testing were (1) that men should not be bom-
barded with complex information about a disease they may not even have and (2) that 
men should be able to trust their doctors to decide what was in their best interests. Further 
details of the jurors’ findings and their implications in the Australian context are reported 
elsewhere (Degeling et al., 2015b).
Jurors’ deliberations focused on distributing role-responsibilities
Analysis of the transcripts revealed patterned similarities and differences in how jurors 
reasoned about key issues surrounding GP and patient responsibilities in decision-making 
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processes. In early deliberative discussions, both juries tended to construe issues sur-
rounding PSA screening through the lens of a more traditional doctor–patient relationship. 
Perceived inequalities in this relationship and differences in healthcare provider and 
patient expertise were central to their attribution of responsibility. One participant in the 
first mixed-gender jury summed up the juror discussions of the position occupied by GPs:
The GPs have the power … They have the power because they have the knowledge and when 
we make decisions on anything in life, you have to find out what are you basing your decision 
on? You’ve got to get the knowledge. (CJ1-day2)
As the strength of the majority verdict in favour of GPs initiating discussions with 
men about PSA testing indicates, making sure that all men had equal access to the same 
information, and opportunity to act upon it, was seen as being something that men were 
owed by their primary healthcare providers. While some jurors were in favour of public 
communication campaigns about the harms, benefits and uncertainty surrounding PSA 
screening, the majority held that GPs should proactively raise screening with asympto-
matic men. Both of these measures were intended to ensure that citizens had access to 
information in a systematic rather than an arbitrary way. The jurors’ deliberations around 
Question A centred on the institutional position of GPs and differences in knowledge 
between them and their patients. For these jurors, these differences created role-respon-
sibilities for GPs to inform men about the possibility of PSA-based screening for prostate 
cancer:
– how can we be expected to know it’s even available … Because most patients are non-
medical people and they would not know and not know even what PSA the three letters stand 
for … we have to trust the medical professional to give us that professional information. 
(CJ2-day2)
This requirement for sharing basic information became the first step in negotiating the 
distribution of responsibilities between GPs and patients. Rather than seeing the GP 
responsibility in isolation, both juries held that the GP’s role-responsibility should vary 
depending on individual patient’s interest in and aptitude for assuming the role of deci-
sion-maker. As the quote above illustrates, a patient’s lack of expertise limits their ability 
to assume their own role-responsibility as an informed autonomous patient. Therefore, 
almost all of the jurors believed that GPs have a responsibility to manage the varying 
capacity of patients, as well as informing men of the possibility of PSA-based screening. 
However, our analyses revealed differences in juror’s views on the limits of a GP’s role-
responsibility and what this responsibility entailed for the reciprocal role-responsibilities 
of patients (Table 2). As they deliberated about both questions, jurors held and occasion-
ally shifted between three distinct positions on the role-responsibility of GPs.
Position 1: GPs should support SDM
Many jurors, particularly those in the first mixed-gender jury, argued that GPs have a 
role-responsibility to ‘put them [patients] in a position to understand what is in their best 
interests’ (CJ2-day2). The goal is to support men’s autonomy by trying to give them 
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enough knowledge for informed choice. Consequently, the GP’s role-responsibility only 
extends to initiating discussion and providing as much balanced and factual information 
as their patients want – the GP is not responsible for men’s decisions because ‘patients 
are the best people to look after their own health, and everything should flow from that’ 
Table 2. Positions taken by jurors during deliberation.
GP role-responsibilities Patient role-responsibilities
Position 1
GPs should support 
shared decision-making 
(for all men)
•• To inform men about the 
possibility of PSA screening 
(R)
•• To adapt to differences in 
patient capacity and provide 
as much balanced and factual 
information as each man 
requires (R)
•• To work with men to make 
sure a good decision is made 
without being responsible 
for the outcome of that 
decision (R)
•• To indicate to GPs how 
much information they 
require to make or 
share a decision (R)
•• To take role-
responsibility for 
decision relating to 
their health (R)
•• To work with GPs 
to make sure a good 
decision is made (R)
Position 2
GPs as trustworthy 
paternalists (for all men)
•• To inform men about the 
possibility of PSA screening 
(R)
•• To use their expertise to 
evaluate the evidence and 
judge what is best based 
on each man’s individual 
circumstance and advise 
their patients accordingly 
(R)
•• To fulfil this role-
responsibility by remaining 
abreast of the latest 
evidence and always use 
it to act in their patients’ 
interests (I)
•• To seek out and consult 
those with relevant 
expert knowledge, that 
is, GPs (I)
•• To ensure that their 
GP is trustworthy while 
also accepting there are 
limits to expertise (R)
•• To take outcome-
responsibility for their 
role in choosing which 
GP will make decisions 
on their behalf (R)
Position 3
IF men do not ask, THEN 
GPs should shelter men
BUT
IF men do ask THEN 
GPs should inform men 
and then divest decision-
making to them
•• To protect men from 
the risks of unnecessary 
interventions by not raising 
the topic of PSA testing (R)
•• OR
•• Inform any man who 
expresses an interest in 
being screened about ALL 
of the potential harms and 
benefits (R)
•• To accept that doctors 
know what is best for 
most men (R)
•• OR
•• To take complete 
role- and outcome-
responsibility for their 
own screening  
decisions (I)
GP: general practitioner; PSA: prostate-specific antigen; R: result directly reported; I: result inferred from 
nature of conversations.
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(CJ1-day1). Jurors who held this position put a high value on patient sovereignty, which 
meant they also thought the decision about the level of detail required ‘should be in the 
patient’s hands …, not in the doctor’s’ (CJ1-day2). Yet there was also an explicit acknowl-
edgement that there are limits on how much autonomy patients could realistically 
achieve. GPs are still responsible for deciding what information is most relevant to each 
patient’s situation and staging its delivery so that men have time to consider their options 
before either sharing or making their own decision because ‘consent and autonomy are 
not things that happen overnight’ (CJ1-day2).
At the times during deliberation when this position was being debated, discussions 
were often couched in terms of ‘rights’. Foremost among the rights invoked was a man’s 
‘right to know what’s available to them’ (CJ2-day2) and to know about their own bodies. 
It was ‘not the doctor’s right to decide when and where that information should be dis-
tributed’ (CJ1-day2). Capturing the central tenet of this position that patients ultimately 
must occupy the role of final decision-maker, one participant in the all-male jury argued,
I mean you’re just there to hear information. And there – there’s no compulsion or obligation 
[for patients] … to undergo that test or not. So see – it’s a choice, it’s a choice you make. 
(CJ2-day2)
Position 2: GPs as trustworthy paternalists
For others jurors, it was the GP’s role-responsibility to inform men about the PSA tests 
and use their expertise to make the decision or at least provide a strong recommendation 
as to whether an individual should be tested – because ‘that’s what they get paid for’ 
(CJ1-day2). Jurors supporting this position, especially among the second all-male jury, 
were strongly resistant to GPs insisting on involving men in complex SDM processes 
about screening, which they saw as an abrogation of GPs’ responsibilities as expert 
healthcare providers. They saw the processes of evidence evaluation and decision-mak-
ing as
… the doctor’s job. You’re not a doctor. The doctor’s got the responsibility, not you. 
(CJ2-day2)
Jurors in the second all-male jury argued that burdening men with too much compli-
cated information at the outset about biopsy and treatments that may or may not be 
required was a waste of time. One juror described it as follows:
… like putting the cart before the horse, you don’t have a problem with it, why – why worry? 
It’s only when you have problems then you find out more. I mean I’d love to know lots about 
lots of everything; I just don’t have the time. (CJ2-day2)
Jurors recognised that patients who want this type of relationship with their GPs and 
rebuff attempts at information sharing must rely on their healthcare provider’s medical 
expertise. Consequently, the GP’s virtue-responsibility was particularly important for 
jurors who held this position, with one male participant in Jury 2 noting,
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If I go to my doctor and I ask for a PSA test, I don’t need to have a barrister there with me to 
make sure that I’m read my rights before he takes the PSA test. I trust the doctor … You change 
your doctor if you don’t trust him. (CJ2-day1)
According to this account, GPs should accept a limited role-responsibility, but not 
outcome-responsibility, for men who clearly do not want to understand all the issues. 
Jurors who supported this position acknowledged that by implication, men who saw their 
role-responsibility as choosing a trustworthy expert decision-maker must live with the 
consequences of their GP’s screening decisions. Because the key decision for men is 
whether or not to trust their GP, it was important this trust is rewarded by GPs trying to 
fulfil their decision-making role-responsibilities meritoriously.
Position 3: GPs should either shelter men OR inform men and then divest 
decision-making to them
A small minority of jurors argued that a GP’s role-responsibility was to tell their patients 
either ‘everything or nothing about the PSA test’ (CJ1-day2) before a screening decision 
is made. They maintained that anything in between only created partial knowledge in 
patients – which may lead to decisions that do not truly reflect the patient’s preferences 
and values. A key feature of this account of the GP’s responsibilities is that the preferred 
alternative for dealing with men’s screening decisions was, in the words of one juror, to 
‘keep them ignorant’ (CJ1-day2) and therefore, hopefully, out of harm’s way. However, 
if an individual patient cannot be sheltered from knowledge of the PSA test, as the 
licensed gatekeeper ‘the doctor shouldn’t do the test unless he’s definite that the patient 
understands all of the repercussions’ (CJ1-day1). Differing significantly from the first 
position described above, jurors adopting position 3 argued that men who ask about the 
test ‘can’t decide how much [information] they want – they get everything or they get 
nothing’ (CJ1-day2). The goal is to remove the possibility of ad hoc and selective infor-
mation provision on the part of practitioners and minimise any patient perceptions of a 
positive bias towards PSA screening. Jurors who held this position were more likely to 
vote against the proposition that GPs should introduce the topic of PSA testing with 
asymptomatic men (Question A).
According to this account, GPs should not automatically seek to share decision-mak-
ing but rather should shelter men from needing to make that difficult choice. While 
deliberately withholding information may seem morally troubling, this mirrors the posi-
tion held by the USPSTF and RACGP that there is no obligation (moral, legal or other-
wise) for primary-care providers to inform men about something that is likely to do them 
more harm than good. When sheltering is not possible because a man has requested PSA 
screening, they should be presented with balanced and factual information about the pros 
and cons of testing, before they are handed responsibility and allowed to make their own 
informed decisions. In this way, role-responsibility for the decision is transferred from 
the GP to the patient. Notably, jurors who held this position asserted that GPs had a right 
to try to inform men who asked about the PSA test if that meant they could avoid liability 
for poor patient outcomes. Jurors who argued against this two-tiered approach noted that 
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the first step ‘doesn’t give any rights to the patient’ and the second step ‘puts too much 
pressure on the doctor’ to ensure that patients are adequately informed before a decision 
is made.
Discussion
Previous empirical research in the United States and Australia indicates that some GPs 
are acutely aware that they can attract praise or blame for their approach to PSA testing 
with their patients (Pickles et al., 2015; Volk et al., 2013) and that patients are also more 
likely to ascribe responsibility for adverse outcomes to GPs who discourage men from 
PSA screening than those who recommend it (Gattellari and Ward, 2004; Howard et al., 
2013). The majority endorsement in both juries for GPs raising the topic of PSA testing 
(Question A) indicates that well-informed members of the public are likely to expect 
healthcare providers to ensure that all men of screening age are informed about the exist-
ence of the PSA test and the possibility of prostate cancer screening – even if those with 
relevant expertise believe they have valid reasons for withholding this information. The 
central value underpinning this position was the need for equality of opportunity to know 
about the potential to screen for prostate cancer and then to act upon this knowledge 
according to their own priorities, values and preferences.
Notably, for a significant number of jurors these preferences and values included GPs 
making expert judgements on behalf of their patients. In this regard, the verdicts on 
Question B were less clear, with the juries voting for different positions on what role GPs 
should take in initial screening decision-making and how they should discharge their 
responsibility for information provision. The first all-ages mixed-gender jury placed 
greater emphasis on seeking to build patient expertise and respect their right to make deci-
sions about their own health; the second jury comprising entirely of men of screening age 
was more inclined towards more traditional paternalistic doctor–patient relationship. 
Differences in each jury’s composition are a likely partial explanation of these different 
results; however, our analysis demonstrates there is considerable nuance in this variation. 
Our examination of each jury’s deliberations highlights how the allocation of responsibili-
ties in PSA screening decision-making is likely to vary depending on how patient auton-
omy is constructed and valued during interactions between GPs and their patients.
Respect and/or support for patients’ autonomy is widely regarded as a defining prin-
ciple of ethical medical care. The relationship between autonomy and responsibility is 
complex, not least because both concepts are contested and have a variety of formula-
tions. Nonetheless, it is commonly held that if someone acts autonomously, a prima facie 
case can be made that they are also responsible – even if it is possible to argue that each 
is not always a sufficient condition for the other (Christman, 2015). The dominant view 
in the first mixed-gender jury was that supporting and respecting autonomy are about 
making sure men have enough knowledge to make their own decision. Decisional auton-
omy in this instance is not conceived as a property of individuals but as a relational and 
graded experience. The goal is to engage men in deliberation so that they can reflect and 
come to their own decision. As an ideal, this form of SDM seeks to strike a balance 
between patient self-realisation and professional beneficence such that the GP employs 
their expertise to make sure that a good decision is made (Entwistle et al., 2012).
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In contrast, the second all-male jury construed support and respect for patient auton-
omy as being able to give the GP permission to decide for you and assess this decision 
against your sense of self/what is right for you. For these jurors, information about pos-
sible future outcomes was less central to autonomy than receiving a set of justifications 
for the proposed course of action and having the option of rejecting it (Mendick et al., 
2010; Sinding et al., 2010). Jurors who took this position argued men should be able to 
decline the opportunity to become a lay-expert. They wanted GPs to take role-responsi-
bility for decisions, but not because they saw this as means of limiting their own liability. 
Instead, a high value was placed on GPs being trusted to know what was in their patient’s 
best interest. Arguably, this is another form of relational autonomy, in which the GP’s 
engagement with the patient, and knowledge of what matters to them, allows the patient 
to delegate decision-making to the GP. The autonomy sought here is a sense of engage-
ment with and ownership of their health care (Kukla, 2005). Because men who want this 
relationship with their GP may lack, or do not wish to acquire, enough knowledge to 
make an informed decision about PSA testing, it may not be appropriate to force respon-
sibility for this role on them.
Finally, a small minority of jurors proposed a two-tiered approach where men are 
sheltered from choices that are potentially harmful to them until the topic is raised; then 
the patient is treated as being an independent and fully autonomous decision-maker. The 
first stage of this approach exemplifies decisional paternalism (Carter et al., 2015). The 
GP withholds the option of PSA testing because of a judgement that this will prevent 
men’s well-being from decreasing. The second stage implements respect for a decisional 
form of autonomy (Mackenzie, 2014); the emphasis is on providing information than 
expecting patients to choose between discrete options independently (without being 
influenced). Notably, within this position, professional beneficence and self-determina-
tion are held as mutually exclusive – in direct contrast to the idea of ‘shared’ decision-
making. First denying and then locating autonomy in the individual in this way are 
internally inconsistent: it begins by violating the model of autonomy that it ends up being 
based on. Arguably, the two-stage solution allows no middle ground: either GPs or men 
are forced to take on complete role-responsibility and, depending on prevailing social 
norms, all that this entails in terms of being held responsible for decision outcomes.
There are risks in all of the different ways of seeking to support men in their decision-
making about PSA screening (Sandman and Munthe, 2010). Some critics suggest that 
SDM amounts to an attempt to avoid institutional accountability because it combines an 
increase in patient power with increased responsibility as decision-maker (Barnes et al., 
2007). This relies on the creation and valorisation of new types of ‘responsible patients’ 
who are empowered in some ways but also potentially more vulnerable in others. If not 
properly supported, patients who take on this role can suffer from information overload, 
misconceive the evidence and become blocked and anxious about the burden of that 
responsibility (Entwistle et al., 2012). This reinforces the observation central to the posi-
tion taken by the second all-male jury that it might be unfair to involve men in some 
forms of decision-making – especially if the development of this role is overly onerous 
for the patient and disrupts what they value in relationships with healthcare providers 
(Munthe et al., 2012). Yet Vincent’s taxonomy suggests it is also conceivable that a GP 
could be held morally, if not legally, responsible for failing to attempt to build knowledge 
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and expertise, if the decision is seen to be causally relevant to an unfavourable outcome 
for the patient. Consequently, if men have a right to know about the PSA test, then men 
may have a responsibility to tell GPs how much information they want and what role 
they are comfortable with assuming. This also suggests that men’s right to refuse testing 
or information about testing places limits on the GP’s responsibility for patient outcomes. 
That said, if some men want to trust their GPs so much as to think that the offer of the 
test is sufficient justification for them to accept, then it is essential that GPs have suffi-
cient evidence that the potential benefits of testing outweigh the potential harms, which 
is currently not the case for PSA screening.
Strengths and limitations
Community juries are not intended to be statistically representative of the wider popula-
tion – they do, however, offer valuable insights on the range and nature of informed 
views of citizens and service users (Degeling et al., 2015a). Possible limitations include 
the focus on urban Sydney, as juries drawn from other settings and locations may weigh 
up and value the potential harms and benefits of PSA-based screening differently.
Conclusion
Our results show an informed public may resist or embrace attempts to involve them in 
decision-making processes, particularly in the context of uncertain evidence. Role allo-
cation in decision-making processes is likely to be strongly affected by the capacities of 
individual men and also what they value most in their relationships with primary health-
care providers. Although the policy context for PSA testing varies around the world, 
these findings have implications for practice and policy. It is commonly held that it is the 
responsibility of those offering the screening test to provide information about the poten-
tial harms and benefits of testing (Andermann et al., 2008). However, both in Australia 
and internationally, there are clear differences in how GPs, statutory authorities and pro-
fessional bodies construe their obligations to ensure men at risk of prostate cancer receive 
appropriate care (Knight, 2014; Pickles et al., 2015). Our detailed analysis of jury delib-
erations highlights that even when they are well-informed about the issues, ordinary 
members of the public and potential PSA screening service users can also hold rationally 
defendable yet diverse and even opposing positions.
Almost all jurors thought that having a PSA test was a difficult choice for which men 
needed to take personal responsibility – which concurs with findings of a previous com-
munity jury held on the Gold Coast in Australia (Rychetnik et al., 2014). However, our 
study suggests that what this responsibility entails can vary from full participation in 
SDM to full delegation to GPs. Qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews with 32 
Australian GPs indicates that primary healthcare providers also hold a range of positions 
on how to responsibly manage PSA testing in their patients (Pickles et al., 2015). These 
range from seeing testing as an absolute obligation, through to fully accept the risks of 
under-testing with advising against it. Therefore, it is likely that the allocation of roles 
and responsibilities between GPs and men in PSA screening decisions must rely on indi-
vidual negotiations and that this could lead to miscommunication or even conflict unless 
Degeling et al. 481
it is handled consciously and carefully. SDM is being proposed as the ideal approach to 
the dilemmas posed by PSA testing, yet a one-size-fits-all solution is likely to undermine 
some men’s autonomy. The findings of this study may offer valuable insights to inform 
such discussions.
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